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Does the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
Mandate Relief for Victims of
Diplomatic Immunity Abuse?
Most Americans share the conviction that no wrong should go un-
punished and that every victim should have his "day in court." Whether
based on the wish to maintain the status quo or the basic human desire
for revenge,1 the American system of legal redress focuses on two theo-
ries of personal accountability: restitution2 and retribution. Although
these theories are prevalent throughout American law, they have found
no place in the laws governing diplomats.4 Indeed, the doctrine of diplo-
matic immunity represents "an extraordinary departure from the con-
ventional practice of holding individuals accountable for their wrongful
actions." 5
The doctrine of diplomatic immunity embodies two principles. It
protects the personal inviolability of the diplomat6 and prohibits a diplo-
mat from being subjected to the administrative, civil, or criminal jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state.7
1. "The penalty is... not just a means of crime prevention but a merited response to the
actor's deed, 'rectifying the balance' in the Kantian sense and expressing moral reprobation of
the actor for the wrong." A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 51 (1976).
2. Restitution is used here not in its meaning in the law of contracts, but in its common
meaning, e.g.: "ft]he act.., of compensating for loss, damage, or injury." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1054 (5th college ed. 1982).
3. Retribution is the oldest theory of punishment, and the one which still com-
mands considerable respect from the general public. By this theory, also called re-
venge or retaliation, punishment (the infliction of suffering) is imposed by society on
criminals in order to obtain revenge, or perhaps (under the less emotional concept of
retribution) because it is only fitting and just that one who has caused harm to others
should himself suffer for it.
W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW 25-26 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
4. The theories of restitution and retribution similarly have not influenced the laws gov-
erning the extension of immunity to consuls and international organizations as well. This
Note, however, will focus exclusively on the law of diplomatic immunity.
5. Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Relations Act of
1978, 54 TUL. L. Rnv. 661, 667 (1980).
6. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (1979).
7. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 710 (1971); W.
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (8th ed. 1934). One commentator has
astutely noted that diplomatic immunity prevents the receiving state from exercising enforce-
ment jurisdiction (the state's "power to enforce laws and regulations through legal action"),
while leaving intact the receiving state's prescriptive jurisdictional powers (the state's "power
to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its territory"). As that author indicates, such a
distinction is vital since prescriptive jurisdiction would enable the receiving state to prosecute
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One of the most ancient 8 doctrines of international law, 9 diplomatic
immunity was universally acknowledged and implemented long before its
codification in the United States in 1790.10 Not until 1961, however, in
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,' did most nations of
the world formally recognize and codify the doctrine.12
Several justifications for the doctrine's existence have been posited.
They include: the exterritoriality theory, the representational theory, the
reciprocity theory, and the functional necessity theory. This Note will
briefly discuss each of these theories, paying special attention to the one
most universally accepted,13 functional necessity, which serves as the ba-
sis for the Vienna Convention and its complement14 in the United States,
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978.15 Although based on distinctly
different premises, each of these theories recognizes the necessity for dip-
lomatic immunity in the conduct of foreign affairs. As one scholar
writes:
an offender if his diplomatic status is terminated, permitting the exercise of enforcement juris-
diction. In addition, prescriptive jurisdiction provides the basis for an action against the of-
fending diplomat in his sending state. Comment, supra note 5, at 662; see also Empoon v.
Smith, 1 Q.B. 426, 438, 41 I.L.R. 407, 412 (1966).
8. "Since the beginning of government the inviolability of ambassadors and ministers has
been universally recognized in all civilized countries." 81 CONG. REc. 8987 (1937) (statement
of Sen. Pittman). "The more fundamental rules of diplomatic law-that the person of the
ambassador is inviolable and that a special protection must be given to the messages which he
sends and receives from his sovereign-have existed from time immemorial among civilised
[sic] states." E. SATOW, SATow's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 106 (Lord Gore-Booth
5th ed. 1979); see also Griffin, Diplomatic Immunity, 13 STUDENT LAWYER 18, 20 (1984)
(dating the existence of diplomatic inviolability to before the early Roman Empire).
9. Blackstone regarded "infringement of the rights of ambassadors" as one of "the prin-
cipal offences against the law of nations." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68; see also 2
C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 1249 (1945) (doctrine of diplomatic immunity "solidly entrenched in the law of na-
tions"); Comment, supra note 5, at 662.
10. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18 (repealed 1978) [hereinafter Act of
Apr. 30, 1790].
11. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
12. The Vienna Convention is the first comprehensive, truly international conven-
tion on diplomatic immunities. An earlier convention relation to privileges and im-
munities was signed at the Sixth International Conference of American States,
Havana, Cuba in 1928, but only American States were represented. The Congress of
Vienna in 1815 formulated international law on diplomatic immunity, but only as it
pertained to heads of mission. The document was signed by only eight European
Powers.
Garretson, The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 69
(1966).
13. C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 20-21 (1967).
14. See S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
15. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. I 1978) [hereinafter Diplomatic Relations Act].
Diplomatic immunities are required on the ground of practical ne-
cessity.... It is in the interest of the State accrediting the diplo-
matic agent, and in the long run in the interest also of the State to
which he is accredited, that he should have such liberty as will
enable him, at all times and in all circumstances, to conduct the
business with which he is charged; and liberty to this extent is in-
compatible with full subjection to the jurisdiction of the country
with the government of which he negotiates. 6
Despite the indispensability of diplomatic immunity in international
relations,17 the doctrine has proved to be an extremely costly American
foreign policy practice for those Americans residing in cities where diplo-
mats are stationed. Diplomats, aware that they cannot be sued or prose-
cuted for their unlawful acts, violate local laws. From parking violations
to drug smuggling, rape, and murder, diplomats exploit their special sta-
tus. More important, they are not punished and the victims of diplo-
matic immunity abuse are not compensated for their losses. The
possibility of imposing criminal sanctions against those who abuse their
grant of diplomatic immunity is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead,
it will focus on civil compensation for individuals harmed by diplomats.
The prevalence of diplomatic immunity abuse, primarily in New
York, Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., 8 has become the sub-
ject of much concern. Growing resentment by both the victims of diplo-
mats and the public has prompted a re-examination of the doctrine of
diplomatic immunity. In an effort to hold diplomats more accountable
for their actions and to compensate victims for their losses, legislators,
legal scholars, and the public have advanced several proposals to curtail
diplomatic immunity. Much of this discussion, however, has been purely
academic, and the abuses continue.
In light of the judiciary's recent definitional expansion of taking
under the Fifth Amendment, 9 Americans who have fallen victim to dip-
lomatic abuses may now have a constitutional right to "just compensa-
tion." 0 This Note focuses not only on the moral imperative for change,
but the possible constitutional mandate for it.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of diplomatic immu-
nity, including its history, rationales, and enabling legislation, in particu-
lar the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Diplomatic
Relations Act. Part II examines the abuses of diplomatic immunity and
16. W. HALL, supra note 7, at §§ 218-19.
17. Note, Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction: Essential to Effective Interna-
tional Relations, 7 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J 113, 113 (1984).
18. One journalist living in Maryland, one of the states where diplomatic abuses fre-
quently occur, comments that "abuse of the privilege is an all-too common fact of life."
Turan, The Devilish Demands of Diplomatic Immunity, Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1976, at 20,
col. 1.
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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some of the reasons for these abuses. Part III explores the constitutional-
ity of noncompensation for victims of diplomatic immunity abuse, paying
particular attention to the compelling governmental and individual inter-
ests involved. Part IV discusses the growing need for reform in light of
the possible unconstitutionality of current diplomatic immunity prac-
tices. A number of propositions by legislators and scholars to alter diplo-
matic immunity are also briefly critiqued. Finally, Part V advances a
new solution to the problem: a right of action against the United States
Government in the Court of Claims.21 This proposal enjoys the advan-
tage of leaving the diplomatic immunity doctrine intact while levying its
costs on the American public rather than on a few individuals.
I. Diplomatic Immunity: History, Rationales, and Codification
A. The History of Diplomatic Immunity
The existence of and recognized necessity for diplomatic immunity
date back several thousand years.22 Legal scholars agree that "many of
the fundamental principles of diplomatic law as they exist today were
already in practice more than 2,000 years ago."23  During the Renais-
sance, diplomatic immunity evolved into its present form.24 In Venice,
Italy, the first embassies were created and nations began receiving diplo-
mats on a permanent basis.25 With this growth in diplomatic exchange
came the concomitant need for diplomatic immunity.26
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a great number of
treatises on international relations, many dealing specifically with diplo-
matic immunity, were written throughout Europe.27 Among them was
Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace), probably
the most influential work on international law to date. In this book, Gro-
21. See infra notes 267-280 and accompanying text.
22. Griffin, supra note 8, at 20.
23. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
(1979), reprinted in SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, 96TH CONG., 1ST Sass., 13 (Comm.
Print 1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also Preamble to Vienna Convention,
supra note 11 ("peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplo-
matic agents"). Historians have traced the doctrine of diplomatic immunity back as far as the
13th century B.C. to a treaty of peace and alliance between the Hittites and Egypt's Rameses
II. See E. PLISCHKE, CONDUCT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 3 (3d ed. 1967). Thereafter, in
ancient Greece and Rome, it was universally accepted that ambassadors and attaches could
not be subjected to either civil suits or criminal prosecution in the receiving state, nor could
their correspondence be examined. See generally G. STUART, AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND
CONSULAR PRACTICE 115-16 (2d ed. 1952).
24. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 13-14.
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id.
27. Young, The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
141, 147 (1964).
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tius, a diplomat himself,28 declared, "There are two maxims in the law of
nations relating to ambassadors which are generally accepted as estab-
lished rules: The first is that ambassadors must be received and the sec-
ond that they must suffer no harm."2 9 Not surprisingly, diplomatic
immunity, in some form or another, had become customary international
law by the early 1700s.
In 1708, England passed the Diplomatic Privileges Act,3"
"[g]rant[ing] virtually complete immunity from both criminal prosecu-
tion and civil suit to diplomatic 'agents,' their families,3 1 their staffs, and
their personal servants."32 By 1784, this liberal extension of diplomatic
immunity had made its way across the Atlantic. In that year, the earliest
diplomatic immunity case in the United States,33 Respublica v. De
Longchamps,34 was decided. This case, adopting the rule of virtually ab-
solute immunity, became the basis for the first statutory enunciation on
diplomatic immunity in the United States six years later.
Promulgated by the First Congress, the diplomatic immunity statute
of 1790 protected "any ambassador or other public minister of any for-
eign prince or state authorized and received as such by the President of
the United States, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such am-
bassador or other public minister"3" from arrest or imprisonment, and
from seizure or attachment of his goods or property. In addition, the
statute made it a crime, punishable by a fine and a three year sentence,
just to bring suit against a diplomat.
28. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW I (9th ed. 1984).
29. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTIcE 6-7
(1988) (citing H. GROTIus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACTS, Bk. IL Ch. XVIII (1625)).
30. 7 Anne, ch. XII. The result of an international incident, the Diplomatic Privileges
Act boasts a colorful history. In 1708, Peter the Great's Ambassadorto England was arrested
for an overdue debt. Outraged at the indignation, the Czar demanded that the arresting of-
ficers be executed. In response to this and other similar incidents, Parliament passed the Act.
Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN: L. REv. 1517, 1519 n.9
(1986).
31. England's Diplomatic Privileges Act defines "family" more broadly than does the Vi-
enna Convention. Under England's Act, the family includes persons related by blood or mar-
riage and those living with the embassy employee in a de facto family relationship. Samuels,
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, 27 MOD. L. REv. 689, 691 (1964).
32. C. ASHMAN & P. TREscoTr, DIPLOMATIC CRIME 67 (1987).
33. Comment, supra note 5, at 664-65.
34. 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 111 (1784). In De Longchamps, the Oyer and Terminer Court of
Pennsylvania found Charles Julian De Longchamps "guilty of an attrocious [sic] violation of
the law of nations," id at 117, after he had "struck the cane of Monsieur Marbois," id. at I 11.
Although the French Minister Plenipotentary, Marbois, "as soon as the stroke was given ....
employed his stick with great severity," id. at 112, the jury found De Longchamps guilty of
both assault and battery and the court sentenced him to pay a fine of one hundred French
Crowns and to serve a two year prison term. Id at 118.
35. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, supra note 10, at 118.
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"From its enactment in 1790 to its repeal in 1978 with the passage
of the Diplomatic Relations Act, this statute was the sole basis for diplo-
matic privileges and immunities in the United States.",3 6 Even after rati-
fication of the more restrictive Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations in 1972, the United States Department of Justice, invoking Ar-
ticle 47(2)17 of the Vienna Convention, which allows states to recipro-
cally extend more favorable treatment than provided under the
Convention, continued to grant virtually absolute immunity to foreign
diplomats.38 This action by the United States government also enabled
American diplomats to enjoy greater immunities. Subpart I(C) of this
Note further discusses both the Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic
Relations Act.
B. Rationales for Diplomatic Immunity
According to the frequently cited March 16, 1906, letter of then
Secretary of State Elihu Root:
There are many and various reasons why diplomatic agents,
whether accredited or not to the United States, should be exempt
from the operation of the ... law at [sic] this country. The first
and fundamental reason is the fact that diplomatic agents are uni-
versally exempt by well recognized usage incorporated into the
Common law of nations, and this nation, bound as it is to observe
International Law... cannot, if it would, vary a law common to
all.39
Among the other theories advanced to justify diplomatic immunity,
the following have gained the greatest acceptance: the representational
theory, the exterritoriality theory, the reciprocity theory, and the func-
tional necessity theory. Although works on diplomatic immunity tradi-
tionally do not examine the reciprocity theory as a distinct theory, it is
worthy of independent examination and should not be subsumed by the
other theories.
36. Note, supra note 17, at 119; accord Note, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities-The
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978: A Congressional Response to a Vexing Problem, 22 How.
L.. 119, 121 (1979).
37. The Vienna Convention provides:
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention, the receiving State
shall not discriminate as between States. 2. However, discrimination shall not be
regarded as taking place: (a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of
the present Convention restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provi-
sion to its mission in the sending State; (b) where by custom or agreement States
extend to each other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of
the present Convention.
Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 47 (emphasis added).
38. S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 1935, 1936.
39. G. HACKWORTH, IV DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (1942).
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L The Representational Theory
The oldest of the four theories," the representational theory, was
first advanced in the United States in 1784.4 1 Based on the concept of the
ambassador as the sovereign's locum tenens,42 this theory is best de-
scribed in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,43 decided in 1812. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[t]he assent of the sovereign to the very important
and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted
to attach to foreign ministers, is implied from the considerations that,
without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard his own dignity
by employing a public minister abroad."'
Over time, support for the representational theory has diminished
for three reasons. First, modem political reality contradicts and under-
mines the theory's very premise.45 Second, as Professor Reiff indicates,
because it places both the sovereign and his representative above the laws
of the receiving state, "the theory is altogether too wide and fallacious for
the business of conducting international business."" Moreover, on a
purely realpolitik 4 7 level, it is difficult to reconcile placing the representa-
tive of the sending state above the laws of the receiving state with the
sovereignty of the receiving state.48 Finally, as Professor Preuss points
out, while the theory sufficiently justifies granting immunity for the offi-
cial acts of a representative, it fails to justify advancing immunity to a
representative for private acts.49
40. According to scholars, the representational theory "predates the Renaissance emer-
gence of the various theories and is found among the so-called civilized ancients, . . . who
developed the concept that the ambassador enjoyed personal inviolability because he was the
'mouthpiece' of his sovereign." C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 1-2 (citing F. RUSSELL, THEO-
RIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 42 (1936)).
41. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784). "The person of a public
minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers any violence to him, not only affronts the
sovereign he represents, but also hurts the common safety and well-being of nations; he is
guilty of a crime against the whole world." Id at 116.
42. "A deputy, substitute,... or representative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (5th
ed. 1979).
43. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
44. Id. at 138-39.
45. In a world composed of non-monarchical powers, it is difficult to identify the "sover-
eign" to whom a diplomat owes his allegiance and through whom a diplomat claims his enti-
tlement to immunity. This is well illustrated by a "popular sovereignty" nation such as the
United States. Note, supra note 17, at 115; see also C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 4.
46. H. REIFF, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, AND PRACTICE
26 (1954).
47. This term comes from the Greek real or practical and politik or politics. It is defined
as "[a] usually expansionist national policy having as its sole principle the advancement of the
national interest." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1031 (2d college ed. 1982).
48. See H. REIF, supra note 46.
49. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 4 (discussing Preuss, Capacity for Legation and the
Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunity, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 170, 179-81 (1933)).
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Despite the representational theory's declining popularity,"0 it con-
tinues, albeit infrequently, to serve as a rationale for granting diplomatic
immunity. For instance, in 1946, a federal court in New York, granting
a defendant-diplomat immunity from service of process, held that "a for-
eign minister is immune from the jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of
the courts in the country to which he is accredited on the grounds that he
is the representative, the alter ego, of his sovereign who is, of course,
entitled to such immunity."5 " Thus, although diminished in significance,
the representational theory nevertheless continues to be implemented.
2. The Exterritoriality Theory
According to the exterritoriality theory, the diplomat, while per-
forming his duties in the receiving state, remains in the sending state for
jurisdictional purposes. As the New York Supreme Court stated in Wil-
son v. Blanco,52 the doctrine of diplomatic immunity "derives support
from the legal fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabitant of the
country to which he is accredited, but of the country of his origin, and
whose sovereign he represents, and within whose territory he, in contem-
plation of law, always abides."5 3
While some critics of the exterritoriality theory consider it a "dan-
gerous fiction,"54 others continue to appreciate its practical significance.
According to one supporter, Lassa Oppenheim:
Exterritoriality... is a fiction only, for diplomatic envoys are in
reality not without, but within, the territories of the receiving
States. The term "exterritoriality" is nevertheless valuable, be-
cause it demonstrates clearly the fact that envoys must, in most
respects, be treated as though they were not within the territory of
the receiving States. 5
Despite Oppenheim's recognition of its pragmatism, the exterritori-
ality theory, like the representational theory, has fallen into relative dis-
favor.5 6  The many reasons for the theory's demise include: (1)
50. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 4; Note, supra note 30, at 1520.
51. Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
52. 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582, 4 N.Y.S. 714 (1889).
53. Id. at 583, 4 N.Y.S. at 714.
54. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 7 (quoting E. ADAIR, THE EXTRATERRITORIALrrY OF
AMBASSADORS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 260-64 (1929)).
55. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 793 (8th ed. 1955).
56. Montell Ogdon in his definitive work on diplomatic immunity states that the
"recent and current trend is conclusively in favor of repudiating the exterritorial
concept in every form"; [Charles Cheney] Hyde refers to a "complete abandonment"
of the theory; [Ellery] Stowell calls it a "wornout fiction"; (Clyde] Eagleton declares
that the "idea of exterritoriality... has been abandoned"; and J.C. Gregory claims
the theory is "outmoded and, logically, no longer applicable."
C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 9 (footnotes omitted); see also Preuss, supra note 49, at 183 (The
exterritoriality theory "is no longer considered to be a legal principle or an explanation of
diplomatic immunities.").
inconsistencies in the use of the term," which in turn create problems in
determining the scope of its application;58 (2) overextension of immuni-
ties and privileges to all diplomats regardless of rank,59 and (3) the mis-
taken assumption that "diplomatic immunity is based upon the absolute
independence of nations when, in fact, the question of immunity arises
only because nations are interdependent in the area of international rela-
tions."'6 As a result, the theory is infrequently invoked today to justify
granting diplomatic immunity.
3. The Reciprocity Theory
"In general, nations faithfuly adhere to the law of immunities, pri-
marily because of the rule of reciprocity, or, restated less diplomatically,
primarily because of the fear of retaliation."61 While not officially recog-
nized as a separate justification for diplomatic immunity, there is no
doubt that "[n]ations agree on diplomatic immunity because it is recipro-
cal. No country wants its envoys subject to a foreign legal system."62
Therefore, out of practical necessity,6 3 each state is willing to extend im-
munity because its own diplomats will be extended immunity in return.
This theory could be called the "golden rule" of international rela-
tions: Countries should treat the diplomats of other countries as they
would want their own diplomats to be treated. Indeed, as the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently stated, "The degree of pro-
57. It has been called both the exterritoriality theory and the extraterritoriality theory.
Most agree that the former is the proper usage.
Exterritoriality is defined as the privilege of those persons such as foreign ministers,
who though temporary residents in a country, are not subject to its laws. Exterritori-
ality should not be confused with extraterritoriality, which is the operation of laws
upon persons, rights, or jural relations existing beyond the limits of the acting state
or nation but still amenable to the operation of that State's laws.
See Note, supra note 30, at 1520 n.20 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). See also C.
WILSON, supra note 13, at 11-12.
58. Note, supra note 17, at 117 (citing M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY 102-03 (1936)).
59. Id. (citing D. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 49 n.63
(1971)).
60. Id. (citing Note, Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
189, 198 (1972) (emphasis in original)).
61. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 26.
62. Griffin, supra note 8, at 18-20; see also E. SATOW, supra note 8, at 175 ("These immu-
nities are founded on common usage and tacit consent; they are essential to the conduct of the
relations between sovereign states; they are given on the understanding that they will be recip-
rocally accorded."); E. DENzA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CON-
VENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 2 (1976) ("[A]t all times the real sanction of
diplomatic law is reciprocity. Every State is both a sending and a receiving State. Its own
representatives abroad are hostages and even on minor matters their treatment will depend on
what the sending State itself accords.").
63. Practical necessity should not be confused with functional necessity, which will be
discussed infra.
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tection afforded by foreign governments to American diplomatic person-
nel abroad depends in significant part upon the protection provided by
our government to foreign diplomats living in Washington, D.C."'6
Under this theory, a nation may rely, to some extent, on the good will of
other countries to reciprocate when it extends diplomatic immunity, be-
cause each member of the international community has something to
gain by extending immunity. More important, each has something to
lose if it has diplomats stationed in foreign nations and does not extend
this immunity.
The reciprocity theory, like the other theories discussed thus far, is
not without its problems. For example,
the proper national posture is not always easy to determine, or to
maintain, because of a lack of consensus on some of the basic gen-
eral rules. This situation is further complicated by the problem of
determining the categories of diplomats, quasi-diplomats, and non-
diplomats-all claiming at least a degree of rights and immuni-
ties-who have been dispatched in great numbers throughout the
international community.65
Furthermore, just as reciprocity may facilitate the extension of diplo-
matic immunity, it may also impede its withdrawal. Once one country
alters or curtails the immunity it grants foreign dignitaries, other mem-
bers of the international community are likely to follow suit.
4. The Functional Necessity Theory
Under the functional necessity theory, diplomats are granted immu-
nity "to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic
missions."" To hold a diplomat subject to suit would invite harassment,
interfere with the diplomatic agenda and thereby hinder international re-
lations. As one State Department official commented: "If every Tom,
Dick and Harry [could] be haled into court because his dog is barking
too long, he wouldn't be able to get his work done. And it's not really his
work, it's the work of his state."'67 Unfortunately, many diplomats fail to
remember that under the functional necessity doctrine, "it is the work
64. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
65. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 26.
66. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (quoting Vienna
Convention, supra note 11, preamble). In accordance with the functional necessity theory, in
1935 Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that diplomatic immunity is extended "to allow
governments to transact official business free from interruption which might flow from moles-
tation of or interference with representatives." Preuss, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic and
Consular Premises Against Picketing, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 708 (Oct. 1937) (quoting letter
from Secretary Hull to Secretary Pittman (Aug. 3, 1937)).
67. Diplomatic Immunity: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1978) (statement of Hampton Davis, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Dip-
lomatic and Consular Liaison, Department of State).
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rather than the official which is protected . ,,.68 This subject will be
discussed more fully under diplomatic immunity abuses in Part II.
The functional necessity theory is currently the most widely ac-
cepted justification for diplomatic immunity.69 It is the theory adopted
by the drafters of both the Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act. In addition, it forms the basis for all other modem codifica-
tions of diplomatic relations.70
The popularity of the functional necessity theory is attributable, in
large part, to its flexibility and pragmatism. While it provides for "the
unhindered performance of essential diplomatic duties," it also "pro-
vide[s the] justification for restrictions on diplomats' immunity if those
restrictions do not affect the functioning of the diplomat as a diplo-
mat."71 Therefore, it theoretically grants immunity only when it is
needed to promote international relations.
The functional necessity theory has not, however, escaped criticism.
It has been attacked both for its vagueness and for its negative implica-
tions. Its vagueness stems from its failure to define those acts which are
essential to diplomatic functioning and those which are subject to restric-
tion. It creates negative implications because "to hold that diplomats
require immunity to function effectively implies that diplomats regularly
engage in activities that are injurious or illegal."72 Despite these draw-
backs, the functional necessity theory remains the predominant justifica-
tion for granting diplomatic immunity.
C. Codification: The Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic Relations
Act
The doctrine of diplomatic immunity was an established axiom of
customary international law long before its codification in the Vienna
Convention on April 16, 1961. 73 Nevertheless, prior to this time, there
had been no clear consensus regarding diplomatic law and practice.
While most nations had historically granted absolute immunity, by the
late 1950s the world community generally agreed that this blanket grant
68. Ling, 4 Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Mem-
ber Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplomatic
Agents, 33 WASH. & LEn L. Rv. 91, 129 (1976) (emphasis added).
69. "Notwithstanding surviving echoes of extraterritoriality and representation in twenti-
eth century enunciations of diplomatic immunity, the doctrine today is more often premised on
functional necessity." Note, The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and Its Consequences, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 131, 132 (1978) (footnote omitted).
70. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 17.
71. Note, supra note 30, at 1522.
72. Note, supra note 17, at 118 (citing Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity:
The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 54 TuL. L. Rav. 661, 670 (1980)).
73. Note, Diplomatic Immunity: .4 Proposal for Amending the Vienna Convention to Deter
Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 177, 177 (1987).
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of immunity was inappropriate.7' In addition, "inconsistencies of state
practice, including those relating to the scope of immunities and the per-
sons to whom they apply,"'75 needed to be addressed.
In the Spring of 1961, eighty-one nations met in Vienna, Austria, at
a United Nations-sponsored convention to draft a new international
treaty on diplomatic relations. Of the fifty-three articles agreed to at the
Convention, twelve dealt directly with the subject of immunity.76 In
drafting these articles, the Convention " 'examined [them] in the light of
modern conditions, surveying the body of law and practice which had
developed over the years regarding the rights, duties, and privileges of
diplomatic missions' and 'recogniz[ing] the great need for an agreed in-
ternational standard of treatment.' ",77 The culmination of this effort, the
Vienna Convention, "established the high water mark in the area of in-
ternational diplomatic law."'78
Signed on April 18, 1961, the Vienna Convention entered into force
of law in the United States on December 13, 1972. At present, 152 na-
tions are parties to the convention.79 Because the Convention is the codi-
fication of customary international law, however, most of its provisions
are binding even on nonsignatories.80 Therefore, even a repeal of the
Convention could not abrogate American international obligations under
it.
As is evident from the preamble and a number of the provisions of
the Vienna Convention, the Convention embraces the functional neces-
sity theory of diplomatic immunity.81 The preamble to the Convention
states that diplomatic privileges and immunities are granted (1) "[to
maintain] international peace and security," (2) to "contribute to the de-
velopment of friendly relations among nations," and (3) "not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of dip-
lomatic missions as representing States." '82
Pursuant to Articles 31 and 37, which describe the scope of immu-
nity granted to members of the diplomatic, administrative, technical, and
service staffs as well as their families and private servants, varying de-
grees of immunity are granted based upon the rank and function of each
74. Note, supra note 17, at 121 (citing S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1978)).
75. Note, Compensation for "Victims" of Diplomatic Immunity in the United States: A
Claims Fund Proposal, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 135, 142 n.35 (1980).
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, arts. 29-40.
77. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Hearing-on the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm on Foreign
Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965)).
78. Note, supra note 36, at 121.
79. U.S. State Dept., Treaties in Force 297-98 (1989).
80. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 505 (D.N.J. 1978); see also LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 23, at 15.
81. Young, supra note 27, at 164.
82. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, preamble (emphasis added).
FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE
in the mission.8 3 Under this functional approach, all mission personnel,
except the highest-ranking "diplomatic agents," 4 are granted civil, crim-
inal, and administrative immunity only for those acts performed within
the scope of their official duties.8 5 As a result, the grant of privileges and
immunities to diplomats is granted only to the extent necessary to enable
a mission to perform its representative functions in the receiving state.8 6
Although some consider the Vienna Convention the "most success-
ful product so far of the United Nations' legislative process,"8 " it has
encountered difficulties. As discussed above, 8 with the ratification of the
Vienna Convention in 1972, two sets of diplomatic law existed in
America: the Vienna Convention and the 1790 Act. On the one hand,
the Vienna Convention represented an effort to curtail diplomatic immu-
nity, extending immunity only where it furthered diplomatic functioning.
On the other hand, the 1790 Act granted virtually absolute diplomatic
immunity. As expected, this dual system created significant inconsisten-
cies in diplomatic practice.8 9
Another related problem involved the Vienna Convention's inade-
quate system of recourse. While the Convention extended to diplomats
the greater immunities available under the 1790 statute, "United States
citizens injured by diplomatic tortfeasors were left without compensation
or a means of redress for their injuries."90 The abuses by diplomats are
discussed more fully in Part I1.91
83. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, arts. 31, 37.
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. l(e). Under this provision, the Convention
defines a "diplomatic agent" as "the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of
the mission."
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 37; see generally Note, supra note 73, at 190-
93.
86. Garretson, The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. RE'v.
67, 70 (1966). Article 3(1) of the Convention sets forth the recognized legitimate functions of a
diplomatic mission as follows: (a) representing the sending state in the receiving state; (b)
protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its nationals, within the
limits permitted by international law; (c) negotiating with the government of the receiving
state; (d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state,
and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state; and (e) promoting friendly rela-
tions between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural
and scientific relations. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(1). See also Comment, supra
note 5, at 682:
Read in the light of the Convention's reference to the theory of functional necessity,
this listing of the mission's functions seems to indicate that diplomatic immunity
should be extended only where the work of the mission as a whole would be dis-
rupted, and not simply where the actions of a particular mission member would be
restricted ....
87. E. DENZA, supra note 62, at 1.
88. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
89. Note, The Effect of the Diplomatic Relations Act, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 354, 356
(1981).
90. Id. at 357.
91. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
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Also adopting the functional necessity theory, the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act 92 was promulgated to eradicate inconsistencies in the law of
diplomatic immunity93 and to correct diplomatic immunity abuses.94
The specific aims of the Act are to
(1) codify the privileges and immunities of the Vienna Convention
as the sole United States law on the subject; (2) repeal existing fed-
eral legislation which is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention;
(3) require foreign diplomats in the United States to carry liability
insurance against risks arising from the operation in the United
States of automobiles, vessels, or aircraft, at a level to be estab-
lished by the executive; (4) create, as a matter of federal law, a
substantive right of an injured or damaged party to proceed di-
rectly against the insurance company; [and] (5) make certain con-
forming amendments to the Judiciary Code.95
The Diplomatic Relations Act, like the Vienna Convention, theoret-
ically extends immunity only where necessary for the performance of
diplomatic functioning. In practice, however, the Act has proved nearly
as ineffectual as the Vienna Convention in confining immunity. Overall,
"the Act has not lived up to its supporters' expectations because of poor
organization, lack of co-operation from the diplomats themselves, and
inadequate enforcement mechanisms."96
II. Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity
A. Abuses9
7
Under the Vienna Convention, diplomats, their staffs, and their fam-
ilies must "respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State." 98
Nevertheless, members of diplomatic missions have on numerous occa-
sions violated the civil and penal laws of receiving states, without consid-
ering the even greater number of such incidents that go unreported.
Diplomatic immunity abuse has existed as long as the doctrine of
diplomatic immunity itself.9 In recent years, however, the number of
92. Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1364). See Note,
The Diplomatic Relations Act: The United States Protects Its Own, 5 BROOKLYN J. OF INT'L L.
379, 384 (1979).
93. See generally Note, supra note 69, at 139-41.
94. Note, supra note 92, at 380.
95. Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 15.
96. Note, supra note 30, at 1531.
97. See generally C. ASHMAN & P. TRscoTr, supra note 32.
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 41.
99. "From the moment of its recognition, diplomatic immunity has too often become a
convenient vehicle for abuse, making diplomats who enjoy such privileges members of an
'overly protected class.'" Note, supra note 89, at 354.
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incidents in the United States has been increasing. " Moreover, the
gravity of the abuses that go unpunished is demanding increasing atten-
tion. "It is not unpaid parking tickets. It is not one rapist. It is indeed a
full-scale epidemic of diplomatic crime. One felony is committed each
week in New York [and] Washington, D.C., that is excused without
prosecution . . . o0
In addition to the large number of unpaid parking violations,1 2
there are numerous reports of drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and
violent crimes, including rape and murder, committed by diplomats who
are protected under the doctrine of diplomatic immunity. This Note,
however, will consider only those abuses giving rise to civil liability.
Only with respect to abuses of this nature, rendering claims for money
damages, does the constitutional analysis and the proposal for a private
cause of action against the United States Government appropriately
apply. 103
The number of diplomatic civil wrongs, like the number of diplo-
matic crimes, is on the rise."4 Reports of theft, property damage, breach
of contract, assault, and wrongful death are widely documented, but
"traffic accidents and resulting injuries constitute the largest number of
complaints regarding the misuses of diplomatic immunity."1 °5 Two such
traffic accidents, involving David Hearne, the son of the Irish ambassa-
dor to the United States, and Alberto Watson-Fabrega, connected with
the Panamanian embassy, exemplify the problem of immunity abuse and
its inequities.
On November 11, 1959, David Hearne, reportedly involved in four
prior instances of disorderly conduct, struck and killed a Washington,
D.C., woman with his car.1" 6 Faced with a homicide charge, Hearne
invoked diplomatic immunity. As a result, the charge against Hearne
was dropped and no wrongful death suit was ever filed.
100. Note, supra note 30, at 1518. From August 1982 to February 1988 there were 147
criminal incidents in Washington, D.C. and New York involving diplomats and their staffs
and dependents. Bill Aims at Diplomat Crimes, N.Y. Times, April 18, 1988, at 8, col. 4.
101. C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTr, supra note 32, at 11.
102. From April to October 1976, diplomatic personnel amassed 22,004 unpaid parking
tickets worth $235,490. Id. at 339. In 1980, unpaid tickets imposed direct costs of $300,000
and a loss of revenue of $1.5 million upon the city of New York. Id. at 341. In Washington,
from March 1976 to February 1977, diplomats had 37,905 outstanding tickets totaling
$1,070,730. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Hearings and Markup before the Sub-
comm. on International Operations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977) (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, New York).
103. "[IThe Claims Court's jurisdiction is limited to such cases where the Constitution or a
federal statute requires the payment of money damages as compensation for the violation."
Murray v. United States, 817 F.2d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Mitch-
ell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 401-02 (1976)).
104. Note, supra note 17.
105. Id. at 125.
106. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 187.
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In 1974, 62-year old Dr. Halla Brown similarly was forced to bear
the cost of America's policy of diplomatic immunity. Her story is an
especially vivid example of the injustices inherent in this policy.
On April 20, Brown was riding in the passenger seat of a car that
was struck by Alberto Watson-Fabrega, a cultural attache to Panama.
Brown was left a quadriplegic, despite three months in intensive care and
several more months in a special rehabilitative hospital. Protected by dip-
lomatic immunity, Watson-Fabrega avoided all liability. The Panama-
nian Government, under extreme pressure by American authorities,
eventually paid Brown $10,000, not nearly enough to cover her nearly
$300,000 medical bills or her $50,000 loss in yearly income.10 7 These are
only two of the hundreds of cases of this kind.'08
In 1978, recognizing the prevalence of auto accidents, the drafters of
the Diplomatic Relations Act included a provision requiring diplomats
to carry auto insurance and a direct action for individuals against the
insurance company.1 9 These provisions, however, have done little to
compensate individuals injured in accidents involving diplomats." 0
Moreover, nothing prevents diplomats from invoking immunity and
avoiding liability altogether.'
The Diplomatic Relations Act covers no other tort actions against
diplomats. Therefore, in addition to escaping liability for auto accidents
because of loopholes in the Diplomatic Relations Act itself," 2 diplomats
continue to avoid civil liability for all other tortious conduct. Further-
more, virtually nothing prevents diplomats from continuing this practice.
B. Reasons for Diplomatic Immunity Abuse
The main reasons for diplomatic immunity abuse are as follows: (1)
the opportunity for abuse provided by the Vienna Convention and the
Diplomatic Relations Act; (2) the lack of enforcement of diplomatic laws
107. C. ASHMAN & P. TRmScOTr, supra note 32, at 306-10; Comment, supra note 5, at 674
(citing Turan, The Devilish Demands of Diplomatic Immunity, Washington Post, Aug. 22,
1976, reprinted in Diplomatic Immunity: Hearing on S. 476, S. 1256 and H.R. 7819 Before the
Subcomm. on Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126-33 (1978)).
108. See generally, G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 515-30
(1942); Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm on
International Operations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
43-46 (1977) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
109. Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 15.
110. As one commentator points out, even where immunity is not invoked, the compensa-
tion provided is often entirely inadequate. Note, supra note 17, at 125-27.
111. "There remains no remedy under the DRA [Diplomatic Relations Act] against an
immune diplomat who carries no insurance or whose policy has expired or is cancelled prior to
a motor vehicle accident." Note, supra note 75, at 148 (citing Recent Development, The Dip-
lomatic Relations Act, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 471, 480 (1979)).
112. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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by the receiving state; (3) the lack of cooperation by the sending state;
and (4) the "Foreign Agent Explosion." Each reason is briefly discussed
below.
L The Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic Relations Act
The Vienna Convention was enacted not only to address inconsis-
tencies in diplomatic law, but also to end the long-time practice of grant-
ing virtually absolute diplomatic immunity. 13 Professing to embrace the
functional necessity theory, the Vienna Convention extends immunity
based on the position held. For all its successes,1 14 the Vienna Conven-
tion suffers from a number of deficiencies that enable diplomatic immu-
nity abuse.
The main weakness . . . is [the Convention's] failure to provide
deterrence against violent conduct. This arises from the overbroad
scope of immunity the Vienna Convention created through its er-
roneous application of the theory of functional necessity. Diplo-
matic immunity is overbroad because the Vienna Convention states
immunity in terms of individuals and, thus, shields from jurisdic-
tion more activities than is necessary.1
15
In addition, provisions declaring the inviolability of the mission,116 the
diplomatic agent,117 his residence, 118 his papers,119 and the diplomatic
pouch, 1 0 inhibit the detection and prevention of abuses.
The Diplomatic Relations Act, while addressing some of these
weaknesses, has not altered the provisions of the Convention to make
detection or prevention of abuse any easier. In addition, the Act has had
little success in deterring diplomats from violating local laws and invok-
ing their privileged status. 21
113. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
115. Note, supra note 73, at 210.
116. "The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State
may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission." Vienna Convention,
supra note 11, art. 22(1).
117. "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any
form of arrest or detention." Id. art. 29. In addition, "[a] diplomatic agent is not obliged to
give evidence as a witness." Id. art. 31(2).
118. "The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and
protection as the premises of the mission." Id art. 30(1).
119. "His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his
property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability." Id art. 30(2).
120. "The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained." Id art. 27(3).
121. See Note, supra note 30, at 1530; see also Note, supra note 17, at 137 ("still enables
eligible diplomats to violate local laws without any fear of legal consequences.").
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2. Lack of Enforcement by the Receiving State
Under the Vienna Convention, the receiving state has the power to
declare any embassy employee persona non grata and to expel him or her
from the receiving state.122 According to one commentator writing in
1981, this power was "not on record as having ever been used." '123 Nev-
ertheless, the United States has, in fact, invoked this power, but only in
cases involving espionage. 24 Even in this area, however, the fear of re-
taliation has persuaded the United States Government to use thepersona
non grata and expulsion powers very cautiously. A recent incident dem-
onstrates the explosive potential of exercising these powers.
On March 8, 1989, the United States Government expelled Lieuten-
ant Colonel Yuri N. Pakhtusov, a Soviet military attach6 stationed at the
Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., for alleged spying."2 One week
later, on March 15, 1989, the Soviet Government expelled Lieutenant
Colonel Daniel Francis Van Gundy, an assistant army attache stationed
at the American embassy in Moscow, openly "acknowledging that the
expulsion was a diplomatic tit for tat." '26 Given this response to the
United States Government's exercising the persona non grata and expul-
sion powers on its own initiative, it is hardly surprising that these powers
are not employed upon the complaint of a private citizen. 27
A second practice that contributes to continuing abuses is the over-
extension of diplomatic immunity by the receiving state. "Under the Vi-
enna Convention, the State Department has the broad discretion to
classify diplomats." '128 That classification, which determines the degree
of immunity granted to an individual, is binding on the courts. 29
An examination of State Department practice discloses a consistent
pattern of extending diplomatic immunity whenever possible.1 30 Some
122. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 9.
123. Note, supra note 89, at 362.
124. See Comment, supra note 5, at 672 n.51.
125. Gamarekian, The Thaw of Glasnost Warms Social Circuit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1989,
at B6, col 1; Keller, Moscow Expels Attach6 in Response to 'Provocation,' N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,
1989, at A14, col. 1.
126. Keller, supra note 125.
127. "The largely political use of the expulsion power ... makes expulsion for less serious
misconduct unlikely. Indeed, there seems to be no case in which a diplomat was expelled for
causing a purely private injury." Comment, supra note 5, at 672 n.52.
128. Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984).
129. Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States of Mexico v.
Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944); see also Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("The questions of the diplomatic status enjoyed by a given defendant and the
immunity to be accorded him are.., questions where a determination of the Department of
State is binding upon the court."); Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1329 ("once the Department of State
has regularly certified a visitor ... as having diplomatic status, the courts are bound to accept
that determination ....").
130. In some cases, those who are not entitled to full immunity are extended it nonetheless.
C. ASHMAN & P. TRscoTr, supra note 32, at 227.
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authorities have attributed the frequency of this practice to the fact that
the "State Department ... is susceptible to undue foreign political pres-
sure when making immunity determinations." '131 Certainly, the fear of
retaliation strongly influences such decisions.
3. Lack of Cooperation by the Sending State
The lack of cooperation by the sending state is another factor con-
tributing to continuing diplomatic immunity abuses. Under the Vienna
Convention, a sending state may waive the immunity of a diplomat.'32
Nevertheless, like the receiving state's powers of expelling and declaring
a diplomat persona non grata,'33 the sending state's power of waiver is
rarely invoked. Frequently, even when a diplomat's culpability is clear,
the sending state will deny all accusations and cloak its diplomat in com-
plete immunity.134
In addition, the Vienna Convention makes it clear that although a
diplomat may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state's
courts, he or she is unquestionably subject to the jurisdiction of the send-
ing state's courts.135 Therefore, a victim of diplomatic immunity abuse is
entitled, at least theoretically, to bring suit against an offending diplomat
in the diplomat's country. 136 In practice, the victim's right to sue a dip-
lomat in the diplomat's home country is rarely exercised. 137
In addition to the prohibitive expense, the cultural and political
climate of the sending state could also pose a problem. For in-
stance, the sending state may have a radically different system of
law. The offenders thus might not face the same punishment as
they would in the receiving state. Moreover, a hostile political cli-
mate might block the victim's recovery. 138
131. Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of
Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 186 (1986) (citing Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp.
710 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v.
Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966)).
132. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 32(1).
133. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text; see also Dickinson v. Del Solar, I
K.B. 376 (1930); Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. (5 J. Scott) 487 (1854). But see U.S. v. Arizti, 229 F.
Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (sending government did waive immunity and defendant-diplomat
was tried and convicted).
134. Note, supra note 30, at 1526.
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(4). "Diplomats are not immune to trial
they are only immune to trial in the receiving state." Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities:
Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm. on International Operations of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1977).
136. Dickinson v. Del Solar, 1 K.B. 376 (1930).
137. Hill, Sanctions Constraining Diplomatic Representatives to Abide by the Local Laws, 25
AM. J. INT'L L. 252, 268 (1931).
138. Note, supra note 30, at 1533.
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4. The "Foreign Agent Explosion" 39
Finally, the dramatic increase in the number of individuals granted
diplomatic status and the concomitant decline in care given to screening
applicants for the diplomatic corps have influenced the rise in diplomatic
immunity abuse. In 1978, 30,000 people in the United States had been
granted some form of diplomatic immunity." In addition, many of
these new diplomats have far less experience and are significantly less
qualified than diplomats twenty years ago.
In a survey conducted by the Foreign Service regarding the new
breed of diplomats, one respondent stated, "In former years, the diplo-
matic profession was 'aristocratic'; today it has not only become 'demo-
cratic' but highly 'vulgarized.' 'Ministers' and 'Third Secretaries' are
about a 'dime a dozen,' ... -and very inexperienced-prone in none too
few cases, to abuse their position... which tends to cheapen the profes-
sion." ' 1 Unless current practices change, which appears highly doubt-
ful, diplomatic immunity abuse will continue.
M. Diplomatic Immunity: A Constitutional Analysis
A. A Balancing of Interests
Every constitutional analysis of governmental legislation, regula-
tion, or action involves a balancing of interests and harms. The goal of
such an analysis is to promote governmental policies that benefit the pub-
lic welfare and, at the same time, to prevent the enactment of those poli-
cies that unnecessarily infringe upon individual liberty. 4 2
As discussed in Part I, "[tihere are powerful reasons for diplomatic
immunity; but these reasons should be balanced against the need to pro-
tect.., the rights of the victims.""' 4  Although the United States Gov-
ernment has the constitutional authority to create legislation and
negotiate treaties, its power remains subject to constitutional constraints.
As the Supreme Court has held:
Broad as the power of the National Government to regulate for-
eign affairs must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The
restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers
expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor
when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other
nations.' 44
139. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 269.
140. S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 1935-41.
141. C. WILSON, supra note 13, at 221-22.
142. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrTiON 3 (1972).
143. Note, supra note 30, at 1517.
144. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16
("[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
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While the United States Government may not adopt policies which
violate the constitutional rights of its citizens, it is bound to honor its
international commitments and to abide by the Law of Nations. To per-
mit the United States, or any signatory of an international agreement or
member of the international community, to avoid its international obliga-
tions would lead to a "dislocation of the [international] community." '145
For example, in the area of diplomatic relations, the revocation by
the United States of diplomatic immunity could seriously endanger the
lives of American diplomats abroad. Under the doctrine of reciprocity,
any country dealing with the United States would not be obligated to
extend immunity to American diplomats. Furthermore, revocation
could severely disrupt American foreign policy and international rela-
tions in general.
The United States is faced therefore with a dilemma: whether to
abandon the doctrine of diplomatic immunity or to keep it intact and
address its possible unconstitutionality.
B. Does Diplomatic Immunity Constitute a Taking Under the Fifth
Amendment?
L The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that private property shall not "be taken for public use, 1" without just
compensation" 47 and applies to the states through the Fourteenth
branch of Government, which is -free from the restraints of the Constitution."); Finzer v.
Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, C.J., dissenting) ("The Law of Nations
clause, like the commerce clause or any other source of congressional authority, can be exer-
cised only subject to express limitations found elsewhere in the Constitution .... ."). Thus,
Congress may not enact any piece of legislation or ratify any treaty which impinges upon
Americans' constitutional rights.
145. Administration Des Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre and Weigel et Compa-
gnie, 2 C.M.L.R. 336, 358 (1971).
146. Private property may not be taken for private use. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386 (1798). As Justice Chase stated in often-quoted dicta in Calder, no law may "takeo prop-
erty from A and [give] it to B" and any law which does so is void. Id. at 388 (seriatim opin-
ion). The Court has recently construed the requirement of "public use" very broadly,
however, with the result that what is considered a "public use" often depends on semantics.
As long as the government's exercise of power is "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose," the public use requirement is satisfied. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 241 (1984). Only when a congressional determination of what constitutes a public
use "involve[s] an impossibility" will it be invalidated. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United
States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under the Just Compensation Clause, "[tjhe owner is entitled
to the fair value to the owner (not the worth to the government) at the time of the taking." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590 n.11 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Almota Farmers
Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); United States v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); Monongahela Navigation v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
326, 343 (1893)).
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Amendment.14 The Supreme Court has indicated that the language of
the Fifth Amendment "does not prohibit the taking of private property,
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power."149 Indeed,
"the Amendment... is designed not to limit the governmental interfer-
ence with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."1 50 When
a taking does occur, the Just Compensation Clause is an assurance to the
private individual that the government will not force him or her "to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be born by the
public as a whole." '151
Precisely what constitutes "fairness and justice," however, is a mat-
ter of judicial discretion, subject to varied interpretations. The Supreme
Court has conceded that there is no "'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated on a few persons." '52 Therefore, whether a
particular governmental interference with property constitutes a com-
pensable taking requires a case-by-case analysis of the particular factual
circumstances presented.153 As a result, the Just Compensation Clause
has not been uniformly nor predictably applied. This disparity of appli-
cation is illustrated by the Court's holdings in United States v. Caltex,
Inc. 154 and Causby v. United States. 55
148. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Although the
Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically refer to either takings or just compensation, some
commentators claim that the Fifth Amendment just compensation requirement is incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which, although more general than the
Fifth Amendment clause, contains the same ban on takings of private property without just
compensation. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 400-01 (3d ed.
1986).
149. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
314 (1987).
150. Ia at 315 (emphasis in original).
151. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 311. Contra Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (New York City Landmark Preservation Law held not to be a
compensable taking despite the fact that the scheme negatively affected only a tiny minority of
the city's landowners while resulting in long-term economic benefits for the city as a whole);
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (court upheld a scheme under
which the island's large landholdings owned by 22 individuals were taken by eminent domain
and broken up for the benefit of thousands of small lessees); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corp., 475 U.S. 21 (1986) (court upheld federal legislation which required employers
withdrawing from multiemployer pension plan to pay proportionate share of plan's unfunded
vested benefits when employer's actual debt to the plan was considerably less under collective
bargaining agreement).
152. Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
153. See, eg., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
154. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
155. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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In Caltex, the Court held that the United States had to compensate
a Manilan oil producer for oil "taken" in the Philippines and used or
destroyed by American armed forces during World War II. The United
States did not, however, have to pay for the plaintiff's oil terminal facili-
ties which were destroyed by American troops to prevent their capture
by the enemy. The Court found that the army's destruction of private
property during wartime was a cost that must be borne by individual
owners. 
156
By contrast, in Causby, the Court found that the loss of the plain-
tiff's chicken-farming business, caused by low-flying military planes157
frightening the plaintiff's chickens, constituted a compensable taking
under the Fifth Amendment.15 In addition, the Court held that the
army's use of the plaintiff's airspace merited compensation. 159
Why the difference in the outcome of these two cases? According to
one author,
the difference between Caltex and Causby ... may appear to be a
difference between more-or-less literal and more-or-less "sophisti-
cated" interpretations of "taking" and "public use"; at bottom, of
course, they represent differences as to whether economic loss re-
sulting from a national policy shall be suffered wholly by those di-
rectly affected or borne by the community as an element in the cost
of that policy."6
The answers to this question and to what constitutes "justice and fair-
ness" depend, in large part, on the competing governmental and private
interests involved and the means employed to advance the governmental
interest.
The United States Government's policy of extending diplomatic im-
munity facilitates foreign relations and, thereby, benefits the American
public. At the same time, the burdens of this policy are disproportion-
156. 344 U.S. at 154-56; accord, United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155
(1958) (a 1942 War Production Board order that nonessential gold mines be temporarily
closed to enable the use of mining personnel and machinery in more essential operations dur-
ing wartime held not to be a taking even though closure deprived gold mine owner of opportu-
nity for profit); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) (government's
requisition of steel manufacturer's entire production for 1918, making it impossible for manu-
facturer to produce steel for others, held not to be a taking of customer's property despite
customer's contract with steel company).
157. The military planes in Causby, unlike those in Caltex, were being flown during
peacetime.
158. As a result of the noise [from the planes] respondents had to give up their
chicken business. As many as six to ten chickens were killed in one day by flying into
the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Produc-
tion also fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a com-
mercial chicken farm.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 256 (1946).
159. Id at 256-67.
160. L. HENKIN, supra note 142, at 259-60 (emphasis added).
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ately levied on a small number of individuals. These individuals, denied
redress for diplomatic abuses under the doctrine of diplomatic immunity,
are forced to cover their own losses. As illustrated in Part 11,161 these
losses can be staggering.
Although the United States Government has legitimate interests in
protecting its diplomats abroad and in promoting international relations,
both of which are advanced by the policy of granting diplomatic immu-
nity, those individuals harmed by diplomats have an arguably equal in-
terest in redressing their injuries which this policy denies. Consequently,
the issue arises whether an individual who is harmed by a diplomat, but
is prohibited from either recovering his or her property or instituting a
suit by the doctrine of diplomatic immunity, has a takings claim against
the United States Government.
This Note proposes that such a prohibition constitutes a compensa-
ble taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The taking
may involve either physical property, through, for example, shoplifting
or theft, or less tangible property interests, such as the right to bring a
cause of action. While tangible property interests clearly fall within the
traditional definition of "property," intangible property interests have
proved more problematic under the takings analysis.
A number of commentators have asserted, however, that "the grant-
ing of diplomatic immunity may constitute a taking of a private litigant's
property interest." 162 According to these commentators and dicta in re-
cent cases, because of the expanding judicial definitions of "property"
and "taking," "courts are [now] holding out the possibility of recovery in
areas heretofore foreclosed."' 163 Therefore, "even though.., no court [to
date] has allowed compensation under the takings clause,"' 6 victims of
diplomatic immunity abuse may anticipate compensation for their losses,
both tangible and intangible, in the near future.
161. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
162. Note, Ex-Head of State Immunity: A Proposed Statutory Tool of Foreign Policy, 97
YALE L.J. 299, 307 n.35 (1987) (citing L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONST=TU-
TION 264-65 (1972)). While there are those who support this argument, it is important to
point out that as of 1972,
[n]o one [had] successfully argued in the Supreme Court that in purporting to dis-
pose of private claims, in the details of a particular settlement, in the procedures
established for making awards to private claimants, in Congressional legislation pro-
viding (or failing to provide) for award and payment, the United States deprived the
original claimants of property without due process of law, impaired the obligation of
their contracts or appropriated their claims for a public purpose and was obligated to
pay them just compensation for any loss.
L. HENKIN, supra note 142, at 263.
163. Note, supra note 162, at 307 n.5 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd 745 F.2d
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)).
164. Id
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Before discussing what type of compensation victims of diplomatic
immunity abuse are entitled to, this Note will examine (1) the property
interest involved, and (2) the nature of the "taking."
2. Is a Cause of Action Considered 'Property" Under the Takings Clause?
State law, not the Constitution, defines what constitutes a compen-
sable property interest.16 In 1796, the Supreme Court held in Ware v.
Hylton that "claims for compensation are property interests that cannot
be taken for public use without compensation."' 116 This holding, which is
still valid law today, supports the contention that claims against diplo-
mats are compensable property interests. Yet, subsequent decisions by
the Court defining compensable property interests have subjected this
contention to scrutiny.
Since that time, the Court rarely has found a compensable taking
unless the property interest involved is tangible, such as land, or vested,
such as a right under a valid and performed contract. "The less tradi-
tional the property, the less likely the Court has been to find that there
has been an uncompensated taking."' 167 As a result, while victims of dip-
lomatic theft have a traditionally recognized property interest deserving
compensation under the Takings Clause, those with less traditional ex-
pectation interests, such as a cause of action, may have difficulty sus-
taining a takings claim. Indeed, the Court has, until recent years,
consistently denied compensation for intangible or speculative property
interests.
In United States v. Petty Motor Co.,1 68 the Court, in denying Petty
Motor's takings claim, held that a renewal expectation on a lease was not
property requiring just compensation. Fourteen years later, in Flemming
v. Nestor,1 69 the Court held that future social security payments were
mere "expectations" and "not property subject to compensation" under
the Takings Clause. 170 More recently, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group 171 and again in Andrus v. Allard,172 the
165. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 148, at 401 n.4; see also Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests... are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law .... ").
166. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245 (1796); see Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl.
340, 392-93 (1886); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974).
167. L. TRIE, supra note 147, at 610.
168. 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
169. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
170. I
171. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
172. 444 U.S. 51 (1979); accord Chang v. U.S., 859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (court denied
appellant's claim to "the loss of the contingent right to future income for services yet to be
rendered" because "[s]uch future damages are speculative and merely consequential to the
valid exercise of governmental power." Id. at 898.).
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Court denied takings claims because the property interests involved were
too "remote."
In Duke Power Co., the respondents contended that the Price-An-
derson Act, which limited a nuclear power plant's liability to $560 mil-
lion in the event of an accident, provided inadequate compensation and
therefore constituted a taking. In Andrus, the petitioner asserted that the
Eagle Protection Act, which prohibited the petitioner from selling Indian
artifacts made with eagle feathers, was a "taking" of his future profits.
In rejecting the petitioner's claim, the Court held that "loss of future
profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides
a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." '173
Despite the Court's traditional attitude,
[t]he body of rules determining which expectations constitute com-
pensable property interests and which do not... plainly requires
reconsideration in light of the broader definition of property inter-
ests now employed in the law of procedural due process.... There
seems no good reason why the broader definition, incorporating
wholly intangible forms of property, should not be extended to the
takings context. Indeed, some of the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions suggest it is inching toward just such a broadening concep-
tion of 'property' in takings analysis.1 74
As expected, lower courts, following the Supreme Court's lead, are also
lengthening the list of recognized compensable property interests. 175
In Armstrong v. United States, 176 the Supreme Court found the gov-
ernment's destruction of a materialman's lien to be o "taking" of a
"property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment Just Com-pensation
Clause."' 177 Some years later, in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Ad-
ams 178 and Murray v. United States,179 the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, respectively, held that a mortgagee's
lien constituted a "property interest within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment." 8 °
In 1974, the Supreme Court "implicitly held that the sole share-
holder of a corporation has a constitutionally protected property interest
173. 444 U.S. at 66.
174. L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 590-91 n.11 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422 (1982), for the proposition that there is a broader definition).
175. Murray v. United States, 817 F.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
176. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
177. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1520 n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)); see also Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.
178. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
179. 817 F.2d 1580 (Fed Cir. 1987).
180. Id. at 1583 (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602
(1935)).
in corporate assets."1 " Following this precedent, the Court of Appeals
in Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger determined that the plaintiff-share-
holders of a corporation owning title to land in Honduras possessed a
"concrete and protected interest in the property allegedly occupied and
used by the United States defendants." 18 2 "The fact that... plaintiffs
[did] not directly hold legal title to the real property [did] not deprive
them of a property interest in the assets nor [did] it defeat their constitu-
tional claims."' 3
Similarly, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,18 4 the Supreme Court
found a taking of "property" when the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act required publication of petitioner's trade secrets
without compensation.185
As these cases illustrate, "constitutional provisions protecting prop-
erty extend to property interests not secured by legal title."' 86  The
Court, in broadening its definition of compensable property interests,
thus appears to be returning to its 1796 holding.187
3. Is There a Taking?
Although the property in question may constitute a compensable
property interest, "the Fifth Amendment renders the Government liable
only if there was a 'taking' by it of such interest."1 8 The Supreme Court
has found that a taking exists when the government effects a permanent
"physical occupation of property," ' 9 a virtual destruction of property
value due to governmental regulation, 190 or a reasonable "expectation
181. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1518 (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 117 (1974)).
182. 745 F.2d at 1518.
183. Id.; ("Likewise, this circuit acknowledged in Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury that
shareholders have a property interest in assets of a corporation." 424 F.2d 833, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
184. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
185. Only Monsanto's disclosures of trade secrets from 1972-78 were considered compen-
sable property interests. Disclosures made subsequent to 1978 were not protected under the
Fifth Amendment. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 417 n.a (6th ed. 1986).
186. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1520 n.77.
187. See supra note 166.
188. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J. joined by Frankfurter,
J. and Clark, J., dissenting).
189. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (Court formulated aper se rule that a perma-
nent physical occupation automatically constituted a taking and applied it to invalidate a stat-
ute that required landlords to permit cable television companies to install their cable facilities
on the landlord's rental property).
190. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Pennsylvania regulation
preventing subsurface mining constituted an appropriation or destruction of property when the
right to mine had been reserved by the seller of surface rights to land); see also Benenson v.
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that an intangible property interest [will] not be used by the government
and such expectation [is] impaired."'1 91 This Note will focus on the third
category of taking.
A victim of any harm possesses the right to bring a cause of action
against the perpetrator of that harm. Such a claim, as discussed above, is
a property interest.' 92 When the perpetrator of the harm is a diplomat,
however, the United States Government impairs the victim's right to
bring a cause of action for the sake of international relations. Regula-
tions such as those under the Vienna Convention deny a victim of diplo-
matic immunity abuse the right to bring a cause of action and effectively
destroy the victim's claim for compensation.
When the property interests of a few individuals are sacrificed for
the benefit of the nation in the course of either domestic or foreign pol-
icy-making, a taking has occurred and compensation should be made
under the terms of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court, however,
has been somewhat reluctant to extend the takings analysis to foreign
policy.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 9 3 the Supreme Court upheld Presi-
dent Carter's Executive Orders nullifying attachments of Iranian assets
and authorizing the transfer of these assets to Iran. The Court also up-
held President Reagan's ratification of Carter's orders as well as Rea-
gan's subsequent suspension of all claims by United States nationals
against Iran that could be presented to an International Claims Tribu-
nal.' 94 According to the majority, Carter and Reagan, having acted pur-
suant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and in
United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (government regulation preventing building owner
from conducting investigation for renovation or from demolishing building and using site for
other purposes resulted in negative market value and constituted a taking). Nevertheless, "not
every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in
the constitutional sense." Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48 (citing Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1922)).
191. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 148, at 401.
192. See supra notes 165-187 and accompanying text.
193. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
194. The following is a summary of the facts surrounding Dames & Moore:
On November 14, 1979, in response to the seizure of American diplomatic personnel at
the American embassy in Tehran on November 4, President Carter declared a national emer-
gency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 ed., Supp. III). By Executive Order and pursuant to Title 50
U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1976 ed., Supp. III), which empowers the President to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acqui-
sition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation
or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with
respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or
national thereof has any interest,
the President blocked the removal or transfer of "all property and interests in property of the
Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran
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compliance with Executive Agreements (the "Algerian Declarations" 195 )
between the U.S. and Iran, had not exceeded their executive powers
granted under the Constitution.1 96 Emphasizing the narrowness of its
decision,197 the Court concluded that
where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be
a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dis-
pute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can
conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are
not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle
such claims. 198
As a result of the President's action, however,
[c]reditors with enforceable contract rights lost the ability to satisfy
their claims against Iran out of the previously frozen assets. Their
only recourse was to arbitration in a special international claims
tribunal which possessed a limited capacity to satisfy the enormous
claims of creditors, because it held only $1 billion and a pledge-of
which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States... ." Exec. Order No.
12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980).
With the President's authority, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury De-
partment announced on November 15, 1979, that "[u]nless licensed or authorized... any
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is null
and void with respect to any property in which on or since [November 14, 1979,] there existed
an interest of Iran." 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980). Thereafter, President Carter authorized
judicial proceedings against Iran, "includ[ing] pre-judgment attachment," 31 C.F.R.
§ 535.418, but precluded "entry of any judgment or... decree or order of similar or analogous
effect .... " 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a).
On January 19, 1981, Iran and the United States signed the Algerian Declarations which
settled the Iranian hostage crisis, terminated all litigation between the parties and their nation-
als, and established an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the Hague to arbitrate claims. In
return for the release of the American hostages, the United States agreed to "terminate all
legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institu-
tions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained
therein, [and] to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, . . . through binding
arbitration." (App. to Pet. for Cert. 22). President Carter also ordered all banks holding Ira-
nian assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or to be held or
transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury." Exec. Order No. 12279, 46 Fed.
Reg. 7919. On January 20, 1981, the hostages were released.
After taking office, President Reagan ratified President Carter's January 19th Executive
Orders on February 24, 1981. Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. In addition, the
new President suspended all claims that could have been brought before the International
Tribunal pursuant to the Algiers Declarations. Id See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662-66.
195. The two Algerian Declarations are the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 20 Int'l L. Materials 224 (1981) (the
"General Declaration") and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 20 Int'l L. Materials 230 (1981) (the "Claims Declaration").
Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 699 F.2d 657, 660 n.2 (1983).
196. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
197. Id. at 661, 688.
198. Id at 688.
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dubious value--of future payments by Iran. Thus the settlement
sacrificed the financial interests of a narrow class of American
creditors and forced them to bear the entire burden of obtaining
the release of the hostages. 199
According to the petitioner in Dames & Moore, "the suspension of
claims, if authorized, would constitute a taking of property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment... in the absence of just compensation."'2 "° The
Court's response to the petitioner's takings claim, however, has created
some confusion. On the one hand, the majority "conclude[d] that be-
cause of the President's authority to prevent or condition attachments,
and because of the orders he issued to this effect, the petitioner did not
acquire any 'property' interest in its attachments of the sort that would
support a constitutional claim for compensation." '' On the other hand,
the Court stated that, "[t]hough we conclude that the President has set-
tled [the] petitioner's claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the set-
tlement has terminated [the] petitioner's possible taking claim against the
United States."202 Declining to adjudicate the petitioner's claim on the
ground that it was "not ripe for review,"2 "3 the Court held that "after the
international arbitration process had run its course, the... claimants
could bring a takings claim against the United States in the Court of
Claims, now Claims Court."2" This holding explicitly rejected the con-
tention that "the 'treaty exception' to the jurisdiction of the Court of
199. L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 612. While Tribe underscores the inadequacy of the
tribunal's funds, other authorities assert that claimants would be more than adequately com-
pensated. See, e.g., Sperry Corp. v. United States, 853 F.2d 904, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refer-
ring to the" 'Security Account' established by Iran with an initial deposit of $1 billion, and in
which Iran promised to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million until all Tribunal awards
are paid"); see also E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271, 273 (1983).
200. 453 U.S. at 688.
201. Ia at 674 n.6. The Court emphasized the "contingent nature of [petitioner's] inter-
est." Id. at 673.
202. Id at 688 n.14.
203. Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
204. Trimble, Foreign Policy Frustrated-Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction & A
New Raid on the Treasury, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 317, 323 (1984) (citation omitted); Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 688-90. Justice Powell, writing in a separate opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, disagreed with the majority's holding that "the nullification of the at-
tachments did not effect a taking of property interests giving rise to claims for just compensa-
tion." Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 690. According to Justice Powell, takings claims involving
either the nullification of attachments or the suspension and settlement of claims against Iran,
should be "le[ft] ... open for resolution on a case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of
Claims." Id. Whether pursuant to Executive Order or International Agreement, "[tihe Gov-
ernment must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by
using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon
which our decision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Constitution." Id at 691 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980)).
Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1502, might preclude the Court of Claims from exer-
cising jurisdiction over any takings claim [the] petitioner might bring."2 5
In its final analysis, the Court "[saw] no jurisdictional obstacle to an ap-
propriate action in the United States Court of Claims under the Tucker
Act. "206
The Court's decision in Dames & Moore holding the "treaty excep-
tion" inapplicable has met with strong opposition. One commentator,
Phillip Trimble, argues that the Court
misconstrued the critical statutory provision (the treaty exception
to Claims Court jurisdiction for treaty-related matters), overlooked
important precedents, misread other decisions, and ignored a long-
standing jurisdictional principle.
Of more fundamental importance, the Court in Dames &
Moore departed from a tradition of judicial deference to the polit-
ical branches of government over matters closely involving foreign
affairs.2
07
In "recognizing an unprecedented judicial remedy for those whose inter-
ests are adversely affected by United States foreign policy, '20 8 the Court
has, according to Trimble, created the "prospect of takings liability for a
wide range of foreign policy actions[; this potential liability] threatens to
have a significant effect on the foreign policy decision-making process
generally. '20
9
Although there are a few cases "following the Supreme Court's
lead"2" 0 and giving credence to Trimble's fears, the takings issue has not
been entirely resolved and in subsequent cases, lower courts have de-
clined to reach a decision on this issue.
In Chas. T Main International, Inc. v. Khezestan Water & Power
Authority,211 another case filed in the aftermath of the Iranian hostage
crisis, Main asserted a takings claim for payment owed under two con-
tracts between itself and the Iranian Government. The money owed to
205. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689. The "treaty exception," codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1502, provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the Court of Claims
shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent
upon any treaty entered into with foreign nations."
206. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689-90. The Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982)) is discussed infra note 272.
207. Trimble, supra note 204, at 318-19.
208. Id. at 318.
209. Id. at 319.
210. As Trimble indicates, in Causey v. Pan American World Airlines, 684 F.2d 1301,
1311-13 (9th Cir. 1982), "the Ninth Circuit has held that persons whose rights against interna-
tional air carriers are limited by the Warsaw Convention may bring a takings action in the
Claims Court, notwithstanding the statutory bar to jurisdiction," and in Shanghai Power Co.
v. United States, dismissed, No. 674-81C (Ct. Cl. Dec. 30, 1983) (appeal pending) "a litigant
whose interests were adversely affected by the United States-China Claims Agreement has
initiated a takings action in the Claims Court." Trimble, supra note 204, at 319.
211. 651 F.2d 800 (lst Cir. 1981).
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Main for its performance under the contracts had been transferred and
Main's claims against Iran had been suspended pursuant to the Executive
Orders and Algerian Declarations discussed above. As the Supreme
Court had in Dames & Moore, the Court of Appeals in Main upheld the
validity of the Presidents' actions leading to the hostages' release and
held that the takings "issue [was] neither properly presented nor ripe for
review." 2 1
2
Two years later, in Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian
Air Force,213 in which "[t]he facts [were] all but indistinguishable from
the facts of Dames & Moore... ,"214 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit once again upheld Presidential action in response to
the Iranian hostage crisis. Following Dames & Moore and Main, the
court again "defer[red] expressing any opinion on the merits of"'215 Beh-
ring's fifth amendment argument because, as in the preceding cases, it
was "not ripe for review." 216 According to the Behring court, "[t]he tak-
ings claim in the instant case is, if anything, even less ripe than the tak-
ings claim in Dames & Moore. In Dames & Moore, plaintiff had obtained
judgment for a sum certain.... In the instant case, by contrast, the claim
has not been reduced to judgment." 217
Although these courts have deferred deciding the takings issue, they
have not denied such claims. As in Dames & Moore, the courts in Main
and Behring left open the possibility that plaintiffs could argue their tak-
ings claims once these claims had ripened. "The parties have not irre-
trievably lost their judicial remedies; rather, those remedies have been
suspended pending arbitration."2"'
The judiciary's recoguition of takings claims in Dames & Moore,
Main, and Behring sets the necessary precedent to allow takings claims in
areas previously beyond the reach of the Fifth Amendment. More specif-
ically, it lends strong support to the proposition that individuals denied
the right to-bring suit against diplomats have a compensable takings
claim against the United States Government. This proposition is further
buttressed by the absence of an "alternative forum... capable of provid-
ing meaningful relief"219 to victims of diplomatic immunity abuse.
According to one commentator, international agreements under
which "the President agree[s] to renounce or extinguish claims of United
States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum pay-
212. Id. at 814.
213. 699 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1983).
214. Id at 663.
215. Id at 664-65.
216. Id. at 665 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688-89).
217. 699 F.2d at 665.
218. Id. at 665 n.5 (quoting American Intern Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d
430 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
219. 453 U.S. at 687.
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ments or the establishment of arbitration procedures ' 22° are an "'estab-
lished international practice.' "221 Although a settlement agreement was
made under the Algerian Declarations, the Vienna Convention does not
provide a mechanism for settling claims or for any other form of effective
relief. Consequently, a victim of diplomatic immunity abuse has no
means of effective recovery.222 In contrast, although the petitioners in
Dames & Moore, Main, and Behring were not provided with compensa-
tion under the Takings Clause, they "receiv[ed] something in return for
the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an international tribunal
before which they [could] well recover something on their claims. ' '223
"[T]he availability of a suit for just compensation will (if the taking
was constitutionally authorized...) quiet contentions that a taking is a
violation of the fifth amendment. ' 224  The availability in Dames &
Moore, Main, and Behring of an alternative forum appears to have influ-
enced the courts' decisions to defer deciding the takings claims. 2 25 Con-
versely, the absence of any remedy for victims of diplomatic immunity
abuse strengthens the validity of the assertion that they have a takings
claim against the government. This conclusion is supported by Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Republic of Palau,226 in which the
court found a taking because the petitioners were "without access to any
tribunal where they [could] be assured of the enforcement of their...
rights .... 22
7
220. Id at 679.
221. Id (quoting L. HENKIN, supra note 142, at 262).
222. Although a victim of diplomatic immunity abuse might be able to file a direct action
against a diplomat's insurer under the Diplomatic Relations Act or sue a diplomat in the
diplomat's country, neither course of action is guaranteed or likely to be effective in obtaining
compensation. See supra notes 109-111, 136-137 and accompanying text.
223. Id at 687.
224. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Lar-
son v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 697 n.18 (1949)); see also Larson, 337 U.S. at
703 n.27 ('There is no claim that [the action challenged] constituted an unconstitutional tak-
ing .... There could not be since the respondent admittedly has a remedy... in the Court of
Claims."); E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271, 279 (1983) ("[T"he ultimate availa-
bility of the Tucker Act remedy, allowing suit in the Court of Claims for any deficiency in just
compensation, barred any determination that the Rail Act was unconstitutional as allowing a
taking without just compensation.") (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 148-49 (1974)).
225. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689-90; Main, 651 F.2d at 815; accord Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 680 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("That the petitioners in
Dames & Moore had an alternative forum... is an important distinguishing factor. In general,
legislation that effects a taking will not be held unconstitutional because there is usually some
forum in which an injured party can assert his claim .... ") (citing Regional Rail Reorganiza-
tion Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
226. 680 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
227. It at 106.
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4. Compensation
According to the Supreme Court, "there must be at the time of tak-
ing 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensa-
tion.' ,228 When the government effects a taking through physical
occupation, regulation, or impairment of a property interest, and there is
a means of obtaining compensation, the governmental action will "gener-
ally,... not be found unconstitutional." '229 When, however, "legislation
leaves [claimants] without access to any tribunal where they can be as-
sured of the enforcement of their... rights, the legislation must fail. 230
This is true with respect to international legislation, such as a treaty,231
as well as domestic legislation.
The above analysis may raise some doubts regarding the constitu-
tionality of the Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic Relations Act.
Neither provides a victim of diplomatic immunity abuse with a means of
redress for the taking of a compensable property interest. This would
appear to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Despite the logic of
this argument, this Note does not suggest an abrogation or even an
amendment of either piece of legislation. As discussed in Part I, such
action would be highly detrimental to both American and global poli-
232cies. Furthermore, neither abrogation nor legislative amendment
would release the United States from its international obligations.233 In-
stead, this Note proposes leaving the current laws of diplomatic immu-
nity intact while providing "meaningful compensation" for victims of
228. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974) (quoting Chero-
kee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)); see also Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978).
229. In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir.
1982) (citing Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 94 n.39).
230. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 680 F. Supp. at 106.
231. "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obliga-
tion, with an act of legislation." Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Chae
Chan Ping v. U.S. (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Therefore, interna-
tional agreements are subject to the same constitutional constraints as statutes. "That the
treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiations between our
government and the governments of other nations, is clear.... It would not be contended
[,however,] that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids ...." Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 419 (1920)
("Every treaty must be presumed to be made subject to the rightful powers of the governments
concerned, and neither the treaty-making power alone, nor the treaty-making power in con-
junction with any or all other departments of the Government, can bind the Government to do
that which the Constitution forbids.") (citation omitted); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1483
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
§ 131 comment a (Tent. Final Draft, July 15, 1985)) ("[R]ules of international law and provi-
sions of international agreements of the United States are subject to the Bill of Rights and
other prohibitions, restrictions or requirements of the Constitution and cannot be given effect
in violation of them."); L. HENKIN, supra note 142, at 251-54.
232. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
diplomatic immunity abuse in accordance with the Just Compensation
Clause.234
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that just compensa-
tion be paid to a person whose "property" interest has been "taken" by
the government. Just compensation is "equivalent [to] the full value of
the property contemporaneously with the taking." '235 The courts, how-
ever, have adopted a number of methods to determine the full value of
the property taken and, thus, the compensation due.236
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes, in Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston,237 applied the "market value test" to determine
the compensation due: a court should ask, "What has the owner lost...
not [w]hat has the taker gained. '2 31 While this is the "most basic princi-
ple for determining the amount due an individual whose property has
been taken,... [it] is not, however, a definitive test. '2 39 Sixty-three years
after Boston Chamber of Commerce, in United States v. Fuller, the
Supreme Court held that "equitable principles of fairness" should govern
the determination of compensation. 240
In cases involving diplomatic theft, property damage, and breach of
contract, valuation of the property "taken" is relatively simple under
either method of compensation. When, however, the property interest is
an unadjudicated cause of action, the question of compensation becomes
substantially more problematic. As the proposal in Part V indicates,
however, the difficulties in valuing these property interests can be allevi-
ated by providing a means to adjudicate such claims, creating procedural
safeguards, and setting limits on recovery. 241
IV. Responses to Diplomatic Immunity Abuse
The inequities created under the doctrine of diplomatic immunity
have been the- source of great consternation in the United States. Per-
haps without even recognizing the constitutional mandate for this
change, scholars, legislators, and the American people have issued pro-
posals to render diplomats more accountable for their actions and to
compensate victims of diplomatic immunity abuse for their injuries.
234. The details of this proposal are discussed in Part V. See infra notes 264-280 and
accompanying text.
235. Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (citing Phelps v. United
States, 274 U.S. 341, 343 (1927); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 123
(1924)).
236. 3. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. YoUNG, supra note 148, at 416.
237. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
238. Id. at 195.
239. 3. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. YoUNG, supra note 148, at 417.
240. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973); see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3.
YoUNG, supra note 148, at 147.
241. See infra notes 267-280 and accompanying text.
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This section of the Note briefly discusses efforts by Congress and the
American people to address the continuing problems arising under the
doctrine of diplomatic immunity, and then focuses on the advantages and
disadvantages of proposals made by legal scholars. Following that dis-
cussion, Part V proposes a solution to some of the problems of diplo-
matic immunity abuse.242
Since the Vienna Convention, the most significant contribution by
Congress to addressing the inadequacies of diplomatic law has been the
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978.243 As discussed above, this Act,
though highly commendable in its undertaking, has fallen short of its
intended mark.2' Although other congressional legislation has proven
generally less ambitious and successful than the Diplomatic Relations
Act,245 two bills introduced during the congressional hearings that
culminated in the passage of the Diplomatic Relations Act deserve spe-
cial attention. Neither bill was adopted in the final draft of the Diplo-
matic Relations Act, but their "intent merits renewed consideration." 246
The first, a proposal for a claims fund to compensate victims of diplo-
matic tortfeasors,24 7 is discussed below. The second, a right of action in
the Court of Claims, 2 48 is discussed in Part V.2 4 9
The American public has also endorsed legislation aimed at re-
dressing diplomatic immunity abuse.250 In this crusade, the American
people have employed both the "power of the press" and the less com-
mendable "power of the fist"' 25 ' to effect change. According to two com-
mentators, "[c]oncerted media attention can bring results, shaming the
diplomatic community into action to try and improve its tarnished im-
242. See infra notes 267-280 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
245. The following are some of the bills introduced in Congress:
(1) "Providing that the United States shall be deemed liable in the case of any judgment
levied by any court against any diplomat against whom recovery of damages is statutorily not
allowed." S. 477, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1535, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
(2) "To establish within the Department of State an Assistant Secretary for Claims
Against Foreign Ministers and Diplomats; to award just compensation for such claims; and for
other purposes." S. 478, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
(3) "To protect the internal security of the United States against international terrorism
by making the use of a firearm to commit a felony by foreign diplomats in the United States a
Federal felony." S. 339, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
246. Note, supra note 75, at 137.
247. "To establish within the Department of State a Bureau of Claims Against Foreign
Diplomats with responsibility for awarding full and just compensation to persons injured by
foreign diplomats .... ." H.R. 7309, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
248. "To allow a person having a claim for damages against an individual entitled to diplo-
matic immunity to bring an action in the Court of Claims for recovery of such damages from
the United States." H.R. 8364, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
249. See infra notes 267-280 and accompanying text.
250. Bill Aims at Diplomatic Crime, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1988, § 1, at 8, col. 4.
251. Note, supra note 89, at 357.
age."2 52 Nevertheless, the actual success of these media campaigns is not
clear.
In recent years, the most comprehensive proposals have come from
legal scholars. Some solutions asserted by these scholars include (1) an
amendment to the Vienna Convention;2 53 (2) a more stringent enforce-
ment of the Diplomatic Relations Act;2 54 (3) compulsory embassy insur-
ance;25 5 and (4) creation of a claims fund to compensate American
victims. 256 While space precludes a detailed discussion of these propos-
als, a brief commentary will show the drawbacks of each.
First, enacting any amendment to the Vienna Convention would en-
tail exhaustive international cooperation. Gathering the nations of the
world and convincing them to agree to a uniform system of diplomatic
law would be a miraculous feat.257 Furthermore, nonsignatories would
still be subject to a different standard of diplomatic immunity under cus-
tomary international law.25 8
Second, a more stringent application of the Diplomatic Relations
Act, while logically based, would also be impractical. According to the
commentator who proposes this course of action, "voluntary compliance
by the diplomats, coupled with increased responsibility by the sending
state for the acts of their diplomats, would greatly reduce the problems
created by diplomatic ,privileges and immunities."2 9 While this is true,
such voluntary compliance would also require a degree of cooperation
which has so far proved impossible to attain.
Regarding the third proposal, the commentator who suggests a
scheme for private insurance for foreign embassies in the United States
asserts that "[a]ny proposed solution.., should not curtail existing im-
munities in order to continue protection for American diplomats abroad
and should also be unique to the United States in order to avoid the need
to engage hundreds of countries in fruitless negotiations." 2" She is cor-
rect in her assertion. Yet, the compulsory insurance scheme she pro-
poses would inevitably both endanger the lives of American diplomats
and lead to international insurance wars; these consequences would be
far more detrimental than "fruitless negotiations." This scheme would
also require compelling reluctant insurance companies to bear the costs
252. C. ASHMAN & P. TREscoTr, supra note 32, at 345.
253. Note, supra note 73.
254. See Note, supra note 89.
255. Note, supra note 30, at 1517.
256. Note, supra note 75.
257. "[T]he logistics involved in renegotiating or amending the Vienna Convention would
very likely prove to be insurmountable. Any endeavor involving 113 countries is bound to be
so complex that it, combined with the present lack of international cooperation, will ultimately
prevent such a solution." Note, supra note 30, at 1536-37 (citation omitted).
258. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
259. Note, supra note 89, at 355.
260. Note, supra note 30, at 1537-38.
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of the American Government's policy of extending diplomatic
immunity. 2
61
Finally, although the proposal for a claims fund to "compensate in-
jured private citizens who could not otherwise bring a successful action
under the [Diplomatic Relations Act] ' 262 is commendable, it also has
drawbacks. While criticism of this proposal has centered on its tremen-
dous cost,263 the more serious problems would arise in the implementa-
tion of the fund.2 1 "Aside from the fact that the State Department
'expressed displeasure' with the idea, the actual mechanics of funding
and administering such a program would be difficult. 2z62 The "expressed
displeasure" of the State Department should not, however, be underesti-
mated as a serious obstacle to the program's implementation. 66
V. A Solution to the Problem of Diplomatic Immunity Abuse
A. A Cause of Action Against the United States in the Court of Claims
In 1978, a bill was introduced in Congress which would have "al-
low[ed] a person having a claim for damages against an individual enti-
tled to diplomatic immunity to bring an action in the Court of Claims for
recovery of such damages from the United States. ' 267 Although this bill
was never enacted, it nonetheless provides an excellent solution to the
problem of diplomatic immunity abuse.
B. Advantages of the Proposal
Bringing a cause of action against the United States Government in
the Court of Claims has several advantages. First, because denial of a
cause of action under the doctrine of diplomatic immunity constitutes a
compensable taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,268 the
261. Id. at 1539.
262. Note, supra note 75, at 149.
263. "Have you given any thought to the total cost that such an office might entail? Every
time we do something, it seems to get up in the millions, sometimes in the trillions." Id
(quoting Diplomatic Immunity: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)).
264. The expense of compensating victims of diplomatic immunity abuse should be in-
cluded in the governmental costs of the policy. See supra Part III, notes 142-241 and accom-
panying text.
265. Note, supra note 30, at 1531 (quoting Evan Dobelle, Chief of Protocol of the United
States).
266. The "expressed displeasure" of the State Department has been attributed primarily to
the Department's apprehension of creating a "judicial or quasi-judicial apparatus" within the
department. See Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Hearings and Markup Before the Sub-
comm. on International Operations of the House Comm on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1977).
267. H.R. 8364, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
268. See supra Part III, notes 142-241 and accompanying text.
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Court of Claims is the proper place to bring such an action.2 6 9 "Con-
gress has given the Court of Claims jurisdiction of all claims for just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and has been automatically
appropriating funds to pay that court's judgments." 270 The Court of
Claims is both highly experienced in dealing with claims of this nature
and sufficiently funded to accommodate their proper adjudication.
Second, this proposal imposes the costs of the policy of diplomatic
immunity on the proper entity: the United States Government. It
neither forces a few individuals to pay the costs of a national policy, nor
does it, as in the compulsory insurance proposal, 271 require insurance
companies to carry the burden. Instead, the burdens of the United
States' policy of diplomatic immunity are "borne on the public as a
whole. '272 As a consequence, this proposal reconciles the present prac-
tice of diplomatic immunity with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Not only does it avoid the possibility of future attacks for unconstitu-
tional taking, it also places the burden of this policy where, in all "fair-
ness and justice," '273 it should be.
Third, the proposal provides an impetus and a means to punish dip-
lomatic immunity abusers. With the possibility of numerous claims be-
ing brought against it, the United States Government may be more
inclined to declare a diplomat persona non grata or even to invoke the
expulsion power274 for grievous offenses besides espionage. Monitoring
claims advanced in the Claims Court could keep the government ap-
prised of diplomatic immunity abuses. For those who habitually violate
the laws of the United States or commit serious crimes, the records of the
Claims Court could serve as grounds for revoking diplomatic status.
Yet, the exercise of the persona non grata and expulsion powers should
continue to be conducted with extreme caution. Even with adequate evi-
dence of culpability, such actions may invite retaliation and impair the
conduct of foreign affairs.
Fourth, "[t]he provision that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation establishes a standard for our Gov-
ernment which the Constitution does not make dependent upon the stan-
dards of other governments." '275 Because its enactment is not contingent
269. Exclusive jurisdiction for monetary relief against the United States in excess of
$10,000 lies in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491(a) (1982).
For those claims valued at less than $10,000, the Tucker Act grants concurrent jurisdiction to
the District Courts of the United States and the Court of Claims when the claim is founded
upon the Constitution, or any law of Congress, or any contract, express or implied with the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
270. L. HENKIN, supra note 142, at 264-65.
271. See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
272. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
273. I11
274. See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
275. Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 479, 492 (1931).
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upon the establishment of similar remedies by other nations, and because
it affects only domestic affairs, the proposal enjoys the benefit of "being
unique to the United States. 2 76 No diplomats are held subject to the
jurisdiction of American courts. No "fruitless negotiations" are
required.277
Fifth, bringing a cause of action in the Claims Court avoids incur-
ring the "displeasure" of the State Department. Unlike the claims fund,
this proposal employs a pre-existing judicial arena having no affiliation
with the State Department.27 In addition, the claim is brought against
the United States Government, not a foreign dignitary. Consequently,
the State Department cannot complain of foreign policy concerns that
would prevent the adjudication of such claims. It therefore avoids any of
the problems of justiciability that are continually encountered in current
efforts to bring direct actions against diplomats.279
Finally, the proposal enjoys the advantage of leaving current diplo-
matic law intact. Under the proposal, diplomats, staff members, and
their families would continue to enjoy the immunities granted under the
Vienna Convention.280 As demonstrated by the Diplomatic Relations
Act, most unilateral efforts to alter diplomatic immunity are ineffectual
in dealing with abuses. As discussed in Part IV, any effort to amend the
Vienna Convention will almost certainly fail. Although diplomats may
continue to abuse their special status, this proposal renders their wrongs
less harmful by spreading the burdens of abuse and, at the same time,
avoids upsetting the status quo.
VI. Conclusion
The doctrine of diplomatic immunity has existed since the beginning
of recorded history. Although the rationale for extending diplomatic im-
munity may have been somewhat different several thousand years ago,
governments of those times, as today, recognized its necessity in develop-
ing and maintaining international relations. Individuals living at that
time also experienced its unfortunate ramifications: diplomatic immu-
nity abuses.
In recent years, scholars, legislators, and members of the American
public have addressed diplomatic immunity abuse. The primary focus
throughout has been on the causes of abuse: the overextension of immu-
nity by receiving states, the absence of cooperation by sending states, the
lack of deterrence under diplomatic legislation, and the fear of retalia-
276. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 262-266 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
tion.281 Perhaps the time has come to focus on the results of abuse: indi-
viduals harmed by diplomats are being denied the right to bring a cause
of action for the sake of promoting international relations. More pre-
cisely, people are forced to bear a taking of property without just
compensation.
"The Fifth [and Fourteenth] Amendment[s'] guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public purpose without just compensa-
tion was designed to bar [the] Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice should be
born[e] by the public as a whole." '282 The doctrine of diplomatic immu-
nity cannot be eliminated, but its costs as well as its benefits must be
borne by the American public as a whole. Both the traditional sense of
personal justice283 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution require this result. The infringement of con-
stitutional rights for the sake of international diplomacy can no longer be
ignored.
The provision for a cause of action in the United States Court of
Claims would not interfere with American foreign relations. It would,
however, enable an American citizen to obtain just compensation for
property taken to advance American foreign policy, undoubtedly a "pub-
lie purpose." As the Supreme Court has indicated, under this proposal,
the citizen whose property is thus sacrificed for the safety and wel-
fare of his country has his claim against that country; he has a
right to compensation.... It seems to us that this "bargain"... by
which the present peace and quiet of the United States, as well as
[its] future prosperity and greatness [are] largely secured, and
which [is] brought about by the sacrifice of the interests of individ-
ual citizens falls within the intent and meaning of the Constitution,
which prohibits the taking of private property for public use with-
out just compensation.284
We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the doctrine of diplomatic
immunity is indispensable. This does not mean, however, that the unfor-
tunate ramifications of this doctrine must continue to be tolerated.
By Juliana J. Keaton*
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